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Introduction
Informality and informal employment pose a major challenge to policy makers in all parts of the world. In this paper we focus on informality in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as in Latin America 1 .
While it is difficult to precisely estimate the size of these phenomena, there can be no doubt that in these areas of the world a large part of economic activity is not registered or only partially registered and that many workers enter employment relationships that provide only partial or no protection against unemployment, illness and old age (see, e.g., Slonimczyk 2012 and Lehmann and Pignatti 2007 regarding transition countries and World Bank 2007 regarding Latin America).
There exists a large and growing literature that discusses the reasons why employers and employees are unwilling or unable to work in the formal economy. 2 The empirical part of this literature provides evidence on the determinants of informality and informal employment looking, for the most part, at individual countries or, when providing a cross-country analysis, focusing at one determinant. In contrast, this paper is to our knowledge the first that uses panel data covering many countries in order to analyze the impact of a set of determinants on informality. We, however, restrict our analysis to the impact of labor market institutions on informality. In particular, using a hand-collected macro-level data set of labor market institutions, we pursue the question whether employment protection legislation (EPL), the tax wedge, the unemployment benefit level, unemployment benefit duration and union density affect the size of the informal economy in the ECA and LAC regions. The paper is interesting for its broad geographic coverage and because of the nature of the data since, having panel data at our disposal, we can avoid some of the pitfalls apparent in much of the empirical literature that is limited to OLS estimation.
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Informality and informal employment are not only of academic interest, they are actually an important policy issue. There exist equity and efficiency considerations that point to a strong need to vigorously pursue policies that increase the shares of formal economic activity and employment.
It is certainly inequitable if part of the workforce and some firms do not pay their taxes since this implies that those who are formal, whether workers or entrepreneurs, have to bear a disproportionate burden in the financing of public goods that are also of benefit to those being economically active without registration. If the informal part of the economy becomes more substantial this can also mean that governments have to raise taxes and contributions on the formal part and thus have to increase the costs of being formal, which in the final analysis can result in even more informality and a reduced tax base. Furthermore, often workers in informal jobs are severely exploited and are working under conditions that can be hazardous to their health.
Turning to efficiency, most economists maintain that employment in the formal sector is associated with a greater use of physical capital that requires human capital acquisition on the part of the employed workers, while the informally employed often work with little or no physical capital. Since physical and human capital are very important ingredients of growth, an economy with a relatively large formal sector will, ceteris paribus, grow at a more rapid pace than an economy with a smaller formal sector. In the medium run, policies combating informality and informal employment are thus vital for raising income and welfare of low and middle income countries.
These equity and efficiency considerations clearly point to the importance of policies that formalize informal activities. However, the literature on informality provides us with competing paradigms that point to a very complex picture. We need to keep this complexity in mind if we want to discuss policies meant to enhance the emergence of firms and workers from the informal sector and informal employment relationships into regularized economic 4 activity and into regular jobs. The existence of the informal segment of the labor market alongside the formal sector and the reasons posited for its existence have given rise to several paradigms in the literature. One key question in the labor market literature for developing countries is whether informal employment or self-employment reflects voluntary choice or is involuntary due to segmentation in the labor market (Guasch 1999 ).
The traditional dualistic view, going back to Harris and Todaro (1970) , sees the informal segment as the inferior sector, the option of last resort. Due to barriers to entry, minimum wages, unions or other sources of segmentation, formal jobs are rationed. Workers in the informal sector are crowded out from the formal sector involuntarily, their wage being less than that in the formal sector. 3 For example, an increase in the statutory wage in the formal sector will reduce formal employment but lead to a lower informal wage and higher informal employment. During a recession informal employment and output expands because formal employment is reduced, while the informal labor market clears. In this view labor market segmentation between formality and informality is the defining feature of the labor market.
In contrast, in a competitive labor market one would expect workers to be able to move freely between occupations, and for wages (broadly interpreted) to equalize accordingly. In this view the informal and informal labor markets are not segmented, but integrated. Voluntary choice regarding jobs and particular attributes of these jobs, such as flexible hours, working as a self-employed and being one's own boss as a micro-entrepreneur, and not valuing social security benefits, can be the reasons for remaining in or moving to the informal sector (Maloney 1999 (Maloney , 2004 Cunningham and Maloney 2001) . Here, contrary to the segmentation case, formal and informal employment are not necessarily negatively correlated over the business cycle.
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Segmentation and integration of the formal and informal labor markets are two very polar views regarding the interaction of formality and informality. However, as mooted by Fields (1990) , it is possible, given the heterogeneity of the informal labor market that these features co-exist in the same labor market. Fields subdivides the informal sector of the labor market into two categories: an 'easy-entry' informal sector, which constitutes the involuntary segment, and an 'upper-tier' informal sector, where barriers of entry persist and in which participation is voluntary. Hence, the labor market is divided into the formal sector, a 'disadvantaged' subsistence-level informal sector and the 'small firm' and micro-entrepreneur informal sector.
The macro evidence presented in this paper is not meant to lead to a confirmation or rejection of the above sketched paradigms. Instead it tries to identify channels through which informal activities and informal employment are affected in general. Thus far such an exercise has not been undertaken in the literature because of a lack of appropriate data. Anticipating our findings, we establish that in most fixed effects (FE) specifications a more regulated labor market increases the size of the informal economy. In some specifications a larger tax wedge also increases the size of informal economic activities. These two results, dominating our empirical evidence, are in line with the literature, which identifies labor market regulation and the tax wedge as important drivers of informality. The other three labor market institutions have little or no predictive power in our regressions.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The next section discusses definitions of informality, which helps us to better understand the dependent variable in our empirical work. In section 3, we sketch those policies that have an impact on the tax wedge and regulation and thus on informality. This is followed by a section that looks at tax policies, with a focus on the question whether these policies were instrumental in formalizing informal activities that existed in the formal economy. Section 5 is the empirical core of the paper, 6 describing the data, the methodology and the main findings of our macroeconometric estimations. A final section gives some policy conclusions.
Using a broad definition of informality
The definition of informality and the informal sector poses a challenge in itself due to its very nature of not being easily observable (Kanbur 2009; Schneider and Enste 2000; Mead and Morrisson 1996) . A broad definition defines the informal economy as including "unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions, hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to the tax authorities" (Schneider and Enste 2000, pp.78-79) . 4 It is this broad definition that we employ in our macroeconometric analysis in this paper, since informality with this very general definition encompass activities that totally or partially sidestep the taxing authorities.
In other words, this definition looks at activities that are 100% informal, but also at informal activities within the formal economy.
However, we could use a more restricted definition of informality, where a dichotomous situation is analyzed in the labor market, i.e. a situation where workers are either formally or informally employed. This viewpoint essentially restricts itself to the labor market and income generating activities of waged workers or the self-employed with earnings. Even with this restricted view, informality in the labor market is difficult to pin down and can be characterized according to several dimensions, depending on data availability, the legal system present and the nature of the labor market.
There are two reasons why we use the broader definition of informality in our empirical analysis. First, labor market institutions might not only be associated with a dichotomous labor market but might also influence informal activities in the formal sector.
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Second, the only data on informality available for the ECA and the LAC regions are the data provided by Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) . This source uses the above cited broad definition of informality and gives estimates for 162 countries, including Eastern European, Central Asian, and Latin American countries over the years 1999 to 2007.
The impact of policies to lower labor costs and to reduce regulation
The literature identifies the tax wedge and labor market regulation as potential channels that affect formal employment, unemployment and informal employment. In what follows we therefore discuss how lowering labor costs and decreasing the extent of regulation might increase formal employment and thus reduce unemployment as well as the size of informal activities. In economies where income support for the unemployed is weak or does not exist, unemployment is not always an option for those without a formal job. Consequently, expansion of formal employment translates, at least partially, into a reduction of informal activities. We start off with some simple theoretical predictions and then present some of the salient empirical evidence on the nexus of taxes and regulation and formal employment. can expand employment without having to raise the wage. In a second scenario where we assume a perfectly inelastic labor supply the lower labor costs are "passed through" to workers in their entirety leading to a wage hike of (w 1 -w 0 ) and no additional jobs. Most realistic is the scenario between the two polar cases shown in figure 1.c. where the comparative statics take place in a relatively elastic portion of the labor supply curve. Now we get both an increase in employment and in wages. The relative magnitudes of the effects of lowering labor costs on employment and wages are determined by the labor demand and supply elasticities. For a given labor demand elasticity, the employment effect will be larger the larger the elasticity of effective labor supply, while the wage effect is inversely related to the elasticity of effective labor supply.
Discussion of the empirical evidence on the elasticity parameters leads Katz (1998) to conclude that low skilled workers have a higher elasticity of effective labor supply than skilled workers. The elasticity of labor demand for low skilled workers also seems to be larger in absolute value for low skilled workers. Thus, subsidizing jobs for low skilled workers via direct subsidies or via reducing social security contributions might give larger employment effects than subsidizing jobs for workers of all skill levels. Of course, in the presence of large structural unemployment and/or a minimum wage the employment effects would be particularly large. There are, however, at least two problems with direct targeted subsidies.
Employers might not know about these subsidies, and targeting low skilled workers might stigmatize them in the eyes of employers. Of course, when we talk about lowering labor costs via a reduction of social security contributions in particular at the lower end of the wage distribution, these two problems are not present.
Empirical evidence on the effects of lowering labor costs to employers
We report on policies that have attempted to encourage formal job creation through decreasing the tax wedge by direct cutting of labor costs or via job or wage subsidies to firms.
Since rigorous evaluation studies of such policies are hard to come by we cover a variety of country types in this summary.
There are some special pitfalls in the evaluation of wage or job subsidies or of a decrease of labor costs. If these treatments are general, i.e. applying to all firms and workers it is basically impossible to find a contemporaneous control group and panel data need be used to contrast the average outcome of the treated at the time of the treatment with the average outcome of the treated before the time of the treatment. Even when wage or job subsidies are targeted, e.g. at all low skilled workers, we have the same difficulties in constructing a counterfactual.
The study by Betcherman, Daysal and Pages (2010) , which evaluates regionally targeted subsidies in Turkey, is able to establish convincing counterfactuals because they exploit the design of the subsidies and the timing of their introduction in a very apt way. In addition, they match regions as controls that have similar pre-treatment trends of several outcome variables as the treated regions. They thus take account of the point that conditioning on the pre-treatment history and on observables reduces selection biases significantly as e.g. estimates of the pass through imply that about 70% of a 1% point fall in social security contributions translate into higher wages for workers. So, if we assume an average labor demand elasticity of -0.5 a 1% point lowering of social security contributions will only result in an expansion of employment amounting to 0.15 %. Particularly important in our context is the fact that for low wage workers (with wages just slightly below the minimum wage), the pass through estimates are much smaller than for the average worker. So, again we find that targeting workers at the low end of the wage distribution might expand employment most.
The note of World Bank (2005a) also emphasizes this point for the EU8 countries.
An important study on the pass through of lowering payroll taxes is Jonathan Gruber's (1997) paper. He takes advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Chile where at the beginning of the 1980s pension provision was privatized resulting in a dramatic fall of social security contributions paid by employers. Consequently, the change in the payroll tax was clearly exogeneous, making it possible to establish a causal link between the lowering of the payroll tax and changes in wages. To understand Gruber's contribution it is useful to reproduce some of his equations. Labor demand and labor supply are given by the following two equations:
where w= pretax wage; f t = payroll tax rate on firm; and e t = payroll tax rate on workers.
Particularly interesting are the parameters a and q. The parameter a is the fraction by which workers discount their payroll tax payments relative to cash income, while q is the extent to which workers value employer payments relative to cash income. In the case when workers value the social benefits financed by taxation at their full tax cost, a=0 and q=1. In other words, workers do not consider their own contributions as a cost to be subtracted from their wage since they consider these payments being returned to them as benefits 100% in the future. By the same token, when workers think that employer contributions will be transformed into benefits for them 100% in the future, they will treat employer contributions as cash income. The equilibrium solution of this model becomes:
where s h and d h are the supply and demand elasticities. It is easy to show that the right hand side of equation (10) becomes -1 under three conditions:
• Labor supply is perfectly inelastic;
• Labor demand is infinitely elastic;
• There is a complete linkage of benefits and taxes (a=0 and q=1).
, this implies, of course, that the lower payroll tax rate is fully shifted into higher wages, i.e. there is no effect on employment at all. Let us look closer at the third condition, when a=0 and q=1. Assume that the payroll tax is exclusively used to pay benefits to the workers for whom employers pay this tax. Then, when taxes on labor paid the employer 14 fall by a certain amount workers perceive this fall as translating in its entirety into a fall of their future benefits. They thus will want to be paid a higher wage that fully compensates for this fall in benefits. higher wages. These results hold for both white-collar and blue-collar employees.
Labor supply effects of lowering the tax wedge
We now turn to policies which predominantly entail tax incentives on the supply side, focusing first on certain parts of the labor market reforms in Germany ("Hartz-reforms"), which were enacted at the beginning of the century and further developed and fine-tuned in 2003. The parts that interest us here relate to the labor legislation that encourages the increase or the formalization of jobs in the low wage sector, i.e. legislation regarding "mini-jobs" and "midi-jobs".
In the case of mini-jobs, the revised law of 2003 foresees that employees who earn up to 400€ per month (mini-jobs) do not have to pay any income tax nor social security contributions, while the employer pays an overall contribution of 25%, above all for pension and health insurance. For mini-jobs in households the employer only pays an overall contribution of 12%. The previously existing limit of 15 hours per week has been abolished. It is noteworthy, that employees who in a regular first job pay social security contributions in full are allowed to hold a second mini-job where the same conditions hold as for those workers who only hold a mini-job. In other words, the additional income from the secondary job is not counted in the calculation of social security contributions in connection with the primary job. The revised law of 2003 also reduces transaction costs for employers by having one institution selected for the whole country to which the contributions have to be paid ("Bundesknappschaft"). An important point about mini-jobs in Germany is the fact that potential claimants of mini-job status are very well informed about the rules and regulations of the law.
The revised law also stipulates that workers in the low wage sector who earn between 400.01€ and 800€ (midi-jobs) face a sliding scale of social security payments, i.e. subsidies of the employee's social security contributions declining with earnings are set in place. Before the revision of the law the full amount of social security contributions and taxes had to be paid by the employee once monthly earnings exceeded the mini-job threshold of 325€ (the threshold of mini-jobs before the revision). As a consequence some workers fell into the "social security trap" since a very unfavorable ratio of net to gross wages materialized above the threshold leading to strong incentives to keep earnings below 325€ and thus to less hours worked than actually desired by employer and employees. The revised law thus clearly wanted to encourage employment in the middle and higher segments of the low wage sector.
In the context of our paper it is also important to stress that one motive for the revised labor market legislation was, of course, the formalization of above all informal secondary jobs or of informal primary jobs in the middle and high segments of the low wage sector. Another declared aim of the legislation was to have mini-and midi-jobs as a bridge to regular employment with earnings above 800€.
It is uncontroversial that the revised law on mini-jobs has boosted formal employment in the bottom part of the low wage sector. While the available estimates are based on data 16 with some limitations, Fertig and Kluve (2006) The employment effects of midi-jobs are a lot more modest. Fertig and Kluve (2006) establish that about 38% of those in the earnings range between 400.01€ and 800€ take up the scheme. A large number of potential participants are not aware of the scheme or do not understand the benefits arising from participation. Being able to estimate the levels of jobs in the earnings range in the absence of the scheme (counterfactual scenario) and in its presence, the authors take the difference of the two scenarios as the causal impact of the scheme on employment levels in the stipulated earnings range. They find this impact to amount to roughly 25000 additional employment relationships per quarter. Behind this overall effect is hidden a large heterogeneity with respect to gender, age groups and skill levels. Female workers are strongly overrepresented in midi-jobs. Low-skilled workers between 25 and 39 years of age have a substantially higher likelihood to work in this segment of the low wage sector as have young workers with medium skills. Relative to the counterfactual scenario, older workers with high skills show a slight increase in taking up the scheme.
One important concern of the analysis discussed by Fertig and Kluve (2006) and by Eichhorst et al. (2012) is the bridging function of mini-and midi-jobs. Both studies find that mini-jobs hardly ever end in jobs that require full payment of social security contributions and taxes, while there is a substantial increase in such employment relationships for workers who previously held midi-jobs. Particularly worrisome is the fact that firms in Germany since the inception of the "Hartz reforms" seem to have substituted regular full-time formal jobs with part-time mini-jobs on a large scale (Eichhorst et al. 2012) .
A related important study that analyzes the disincentives to formalize jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution is the study by Koettl and Weber (2012) . The authors investigate the role of labor taxation and social benefit design on the disincentives for formal work. They propose a new synthetic measure, the formalization tax rate, which takes into account not only the costs due to additional taxes one has to pay by engaging in the formal economy but also the losses from benefit withdrawal due to formalization. Focusing on some of the European New Member States, they find that the disincentives for formal work as measured by the formalization tax rate are especially high for low-wage earners and that the higher the disincentives the higher is the incidence of informal employment. Their analysis also suggests that existing measures such as the tax wedge may not be sufficient in capturing disincentives for formal work.
Labor market regulation and informality
Employment protection is at the center of labor market regulation. We can understand employment protection as restrictions imposed on firms that prevent them from using labor freely (Addison and Teixeira 2001) . A purely neoclassical view of the world invoking "Chatelier's Principle" would thus claim that employment protection a fortiori must result in the inefficient use of labor by firms. On the other hand, employment protection, which comes about through national legislation, collective bargaining or judicial process, is put in place to protect workers from undue pressures on the part of employers and to guarantee them reasonable employment and income stability. What interests economists is, of course, how employment protection affects the overall levels of employment and unemployment in the medium run and whether the speed of employment adjustment is affected by employment protection. Since economic theory is ambiguous about these outcomes there has been a large empirical literature trying to answer these questions (for a survey see Addison and Teixeira 2001) .
The empirical literature has established that the employment of prime-age male workers is not affected by employment protection. This very robust finding can have implications for the issue of informality and employment protection, since younger and older workers show a greater incidence of informal employment. In other words, very restrictive employment protection might encourage informal employment of these latter groups of workers. Consequently loosening employment protection stipulations for some type of employment might decrease informal employment for these workers. For example, in Spain a major labor market reform in the 1980s abolished severance pay for temporary work and allowed several renewals of temporary jobs. The result of this reform according to Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2009) was an overall increase in employment, which was exclusively driven by a rise of temporary employment contracts. So, one can moot that the loosening of regulations for temporary employment decreased informal employment to some degree. However, one also needs to keep in mind that this increase in overall employment was not associated with a rise in labor productivity and in earnings for firms. A counterfactual exercise by these authors that simulated a loosening of employment protection of permanent jobs showed a more substantial increase in overall employment and in labor productivity 
Taxation and informality within the formal sector
In many countries undeclared work by dependent employees or by the self-employed who do operate in the formal economy is a wide-spread phenomenon (see, e.g., Brookmann et al.
and Sabirianova Peter 2009). In this section, we summarize empirical studies that have
analyzed the effect of a flat tax reform on the informal economy. the authors then proceed to establish the "treatment effect" of the tax reform with respect to tax evasion using difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity approaches.
Households whose incomes even before the reform were taxed by 13 percent belong to the control group while households whose tax rates were higher before the reform belong to the treated group. Essentially subtracting the difference of the consumption-income before and after the reform of the treated from the difference of the control group establishes the effect of the reform on tax evasion as long as confounding (endogeneity) problems are minimized. The authors minimize these problems by using the post-reform income to identify the control and treatment groups. Going through several estimation methods and many robustness checks the authors establish a large treatment effect of the tax reform in Russia with respect to tax evasion as they find that income grows by roughly 11 percent more than consumption.
The paper also undertakes welfare analysis by asking the question whether lower tax rates give a supply side boost to the economy. The authors show that in the presence of large tax evasion the positive effects of tax reform might be overstated by conventional approaches.
Their consumption based approach shows that the productivity effect of tax reform is small relative to the tax evasion effect, i.e. they show that an increase in income following tax reform is not predominantly driven by an increase in labor supply or other supply side factors but is driven by an increase in tax compliance. In other words pre-reform undeclared, i.e. Further details on this source are available from the authors upon request.
The third building block is data on the size of the informal economy taken from the paper by Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) . This source provides estimates for 162 countries, including Eastern European, Central Asian, and Latin American countries over 1999 to 2007. This is a unique dataset providing comparable estimates for most countries of the world based on the MIMIC estimation method.
Finally, we have added some key macroeconomic variables from the World Bank database (http://data.worldbank.org/), such as employment to population ratio, GDP growth rate and inflation. These variables are commonly used in macro-labor regressions for various robustness checks.
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Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the key variables used in subsequent analysis is shown in Table 1 .
Panel A of Table 1 provides information for the pooled sample of transition economies and Latin American countries, and Panels B and C describe the two sub-samples separately.
As can be seen from the data in Table 1 , the size of the informal economy (variable INFORMAL) is quite large in the countries sampled (about 38%), and does not differ much across the two sub-samples (37% in transition economies and 39% in Latin America). These numbers are considerably higher than in the OECD or EU (see Schneider et at. 2010) .
Importantly, the variables measuring labor market institutions and policies are, in general, at lower levels than in mature market economies, especially of Western Europe. For the entire sample, the EPL appears to be relatively flexible, at the level of 1.56 (variable EPL). This is much less than in the OECD or EU, where EPL exceeds 2.0. The tax wedge (variable TAX) is non-negligible, although still less than in mature market economies. Unemployment benefit (variable BENEFIT) is rather small, and its duration is just 7 months (variable BNFT_DUR), on average. Again, this is much less than in most high income countries, especially of Western Europe. Union density (variable DENSITY) is at the level of 32%, which is considerable.
The picture becomes more nuanced when we look at the two sub-samples separately.
In particular, the two groups of countries appear to be similar with respect to only one institutional variable, namely the tax wedge. As regards other variables measuring labor market institutions and policies, there are notable differences between transition economies and Latin American countries. In particular, the EPL, benefit size and duration, as well as union density all appear to be much higher in the former group of countries as compared with the latter group. As these variables are usually associated with better protection of workers,
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we conclude that labor market institutions seem to be more labor-friendly in transition countries as compared with Latin American countries.
6 Table 2 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between the key variables. Again, we present information for the pooled sample (Panel A) and the two regional sub-samples (Panels B and C). Statistical significance (at the 5% level) of the correlation coefficients is marked by asterisks. As can be seen from raw correlations in Panel A, the informal economy is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with all institutional variables save union density, where the correlation is positive and statistically significant. Some of these correlations appear to be rather counterintuitive, for example, the negative correlation between the tax wedge and informal economy. This suggests the importance of more sophisticated techniques of analysis aimed at netting out the effect of confounding factors and establishing causal links between the variables of interest.
Panels B and C show some differences in raw correlations between the informal economy and labor market institutions across the two sub-samples. In both sub-samples, the correlation of the informal economy with EPL is negative, but statistically insignificant. In transition countries, the size of the informal economy is negatively correlated with the tax wedge and benefit size, and positively correlated with union density. For Latin American countries, the only statistically significant correlation is with unemployment benefit duration (negatively signed).
Methodology
Our analysis of the link between the size of the informal economy on the one hand and labor market institutions and policies on the other hand draws heavily on the standard macro-regressions proposed in the seminal study by Nickell (1997) . In that study, labor market outcome variables are related, in a panel regression framework, to a set of variables measuring institutions and policies, as well as by the change in inflation. We proceed in an essentially similar fashion by considering, in the baseline specification, five variables characterizing institutions and policies.
We note that our results do not necessarily have a causal interpretation as both institutions and policies may be shaped by labor market outcomes, for example, via the mechanism of elections (Blanchard 2006) . Nevertheless, we try to address endogeneity (at least some of its sources) by controlling for omitted factors (including unobserved characteristics of countries) using random-or fixed-effects specifications of our regression (2010), EPL measures the strictness of employment protection legislation, TAX is the tax wedge on labor, BENEFIT stands for the average unemployment benefit replacement rate, BNFT_DUR stands for the maximum duration of unemployment benefits, DENSITY measures union density, and ε is a white noise disturbance. We then proceed by adding country and time effects.
7 Because macro-trends in the two very remote regions may be very different, we allow for different time trends in transition and Latin American countries. We then consider additional macro controls: change in inflation and cumulative growth of GDP in 27 the years before labor market outcomes are measured. Last but not least, we estimate the regressions separately for each region, transition economies and LAC countries.
As can be seen from the specification of equation (4), one substantial difference from the study by Nickell (1997) and subsequent studies (e.g., Lehmann and Muravyev 2012) is that we do not employ variables measuring expenditures on active labor market policies. This is both due to data constraints as well as the absence of a clear theoretical link between informality and active labor market programs. 8 In addition, we do not include variables measuring union coverage rates and bargaining type -again, mostly for data reasons, but also due to the difficulties in interpreting these variables in less developed countries. 9 We, however, believe that we capture the essential aspects of wage setting with our union density variable since it is regarded as the most important of the related factors (Eichhorst, Feil, and Braun 2008) .
Empirical results
We start with the results of estimating the baseline regressions using three alternative specifications: OLS, random-effects (RE), and fixed-effects (FE). Table 3 shows the results.
The regression in Column 1 is estimated using OLS. In addition to key explanatory variables, we add a dummy for Latin American countries in order to account for potential differences between the two sub-samples. The results suggest a negative and statistically significant effect of the tax wedge on informal economy and a positive effect of union density. There is also a negative (albeit marginally statistically insignificant) coefficient on the EPL, suggesting, if taken at face value, that stricter employment protection is associated with less informality. We have serious doubts regarding these results. In particular, the first result implying that 8 When we estimated the determinants of the size of the informal economy separately for transition countries and included ALMP expenditures (available only for this group of countries), this variable had no predictive power in any of the specifications. These results are available upon request. 9 For example, how would one interpret data on bargaining in a country where trade unions with high membership rates are effectively controlled by the government? It is therefore no surprise that the World Bank did not provide statistics on the coverage rates and bargaining type in the CIS countries (World Bank 2005b). increasing taxes reduces informality is especially counterintuitive in the light of the theoretical considerations and the discussed empirical evidence on the effects of changing the tax wedge.
We therefore explore, in Columns 2 and 3, whether it may be endogenous, e.g. driven by omission of important factors at the country level.
Column 2 shows the results obtained using the random-effects estimator. Interestingly, the coefficients on both EPL and tax wedge change signs (to positive), but remain statistically insignificant. The coefficient on union density loses statistical significance. Instead, we observe negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficients on unemployment benefit size and duration. This implies, ceteris paribus, that more generous unemployment benefit schemes are associated with lower informality.
Next, Column 3 shows the results from the fixed-effects estimation. The picture is now
very different to what we have seen in Columns 1 and 2. In particular, both EPL and tax wedge are now positively and statistically significantly associated with informality. In other words, stricter employment protection as well as higher tax wedge on labor increases the size of the informal economy. The coefficients on the other variables are statistically insignificant, although the corresponding t-statistics are usually greater than unity in absolute value. Note that the coefficient on the dummy for LAC countries cannot be estimated in this specification as the respective effect is now subsumed in country fixed-effects.
Beneath the main estimation results in Column 2 and 3 we report standard diagnostic tests, namely the Breusch and Pagan test for random effects and the Hausman test. Both are rejected at conventional significance levels. The rejection of the first test suggests the importance of unobserved time-invariant effects at the country level (and thus, inferiority of OLS specification), the rejection of the latter implies inconsistency of the random effects (and, of course, OLS) estimator. Therefore, the fixed-effects estimator appears to be the only one which can potentially deliver consistent estimates of the effect of labor market institutions on 29 the size of the informal economy. In what follows we therefore rely on this estimator and skip OLS and random-effects specifications altogether.
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In Table 4 we expand the analysis presented in Table 3 by adding time effects (which are supposed to control for general macro-trends) and testing the importance of missing observations as well as of differences in measuring unemployment benefit size between the two groups of countries. For comparison purposes, Column 1 reproduces the FE specification from Table 3 , which is now our baseline specification. Column 2 of Table 4 In Column 4, while controlling for differential macro-trend in the two regions, we drop the density variable from the regression. The rational is the presence of too many missing observations for this specific variable in LAC region (see Table 1 Finally, in Column 5 we bring back union density, but now differentiate between benefits size in transition and LAC countries (because they are measured somewhat differently). This robustness check brings no visible changes to the previously reported results.
The regressions reported in Table 5 introduce several additional control variables:
employment to population ratio (variable EMP-POP-RAT, the data are taken from the WB open sources), GDP growth in period t-1 (variable GDP_GR), and change in inflation in year t relative to year t-1 (variable INFL_CH). 11 There are two baseline specifications to which these extra controls are added -the regression without any time effects (Column 3 Table 3) and the regression with differential trends (Column 3 Table 4 ). Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest the high importance of lagged GDP growth for informality, with higher growth rates associated with decrease in informal economic activity. Employment-to-population ratio matters in some specifications while change in inflation has little relevance -at least in our regressions -for informality. Looking at the coefficients on the institutional variables, one may note that four out of five of them are statistically significant, at least in some specifications. The only consistently insignificant institutional variable is union density, DENSITY. The coefficients on the other variables have the expected signs. In particular, higher EPL as well as higher tax wedge are associated with an increase in informality.
Unemployment benefit size and duration, are in contrast, negatively related to informal economic activity.
In Table 6 we analyze the effects of labor market institutions on informal economic activity separately for two regions, transition and LAC countries. Odd columns show the 31 results for transition economies and even columns -for LAC countries. In regressions with LAC countries we have to exclude union density from the list of regressors for otherwise the number observations drops below 30, which makes the results unreliable. The paucity of the degrees of freedom in the two sub-samples makes most of the coefficients statistically insignificant. However, some of the results from the previously reported tables survive. In particular, the regression in Column 3 confirms the importance of EPL in transition economies and the regression in Column 4 confirms the importance of unemployment benefit duration in LAC countries.
From both research and policy perspectives it may be important to characterize the estimated effects quantitatively, as is usual, in terms of elasticities. Below we provide such an assessment for several institutional variables based on the results in Table 5 . Note that since the models estimated are linear, the elasticities will differ for different values of the independent variables. We follow the common approach and evaluate them at the sample means. Assuming the coefficient on EPL equal to 0.9 (the rough average in the regressions where this coefficient is statistically significant) and given the sample average for EPL at the level of 1.56 and the sample average for INFORMAL at 38, the elasticity of EPL with respect to the informal economy turns out to be about 0.04. In other words, reducing EPL by 1% will result in a decrease of informality by 0.04%. Similarly, if we assume the coefficient on the tax wedge variable equal to 0.1 and take the sample average for INFORMAL (38) and TAX (39.5), the elasticity of the tax wedge with respect to informal economic activities (evaluated at the sample mean) is close to 0.1. In other words, decreasing the tax wedge by 1% leads to a drop in informality by 0.1%. For the unemployment benefit, the sample mean is 20.5, and the coefficients -when statistically significant -average -0.06. These numbers suggest the elasticity of unemployment benefit with respect to informal economic activities to be about -0.03%. In other words, raising unemployment benefit by 1% will result in the decrease of informality by a mere 0.03%.
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Conclusions
Using unique hand-collected country level data on labor market institutions in transition and Latin American countries this paper provides some first estimates on the impact of EPL, the tax wedge, benefit levels and duration as well as union density on informality in these two regions of the world. Our results suggest that mainly two labor market institutions matter for informality, confirming the main findings of the literature, which identifies taxes and labor market regulation as important determinants of the size of the informal economy.
Our quantitative assessments show that the tax wedge produces the highest positive elasticity. Hence, lowering the tax wedge might be one of the important policy instruments in combating informality. The positive impact of EPL on informality, on the other hand, while significant is very small.
Our analysis also strongly suggests that cross-country studies of determinants of informality should be based on panel data which allow controlling for unobserved country effects. The results from our OLS specifications (where unobserved country effects are not controlled for) turn out to be dramatically different from what we obtain in the fixed-effects regressions. Figure 1 Lowering the tax wedge to the employer (employer subsidies) -partial equilibrium effects.
FIGURES
1.a Labor supply infinitely elastic
1.c Labor supply has positive elasticity but is not perfectly elastic Schneider et al. (2010) . Key independent variables: EPL measures stringency of employment protection legislation, TAX is the tax wedge on labor, BENEFIT is the size of unemployment benefits, BNFT_DUR is the duration of unemployment benefits, and DENSITY is union density. Control variables: GDP_GR is GDP growth between time t-1 and t, INFL_CH is change in inflation betwee time t-1 and t, and EMP-POP-RAT stands for employment-to-population ratio. (5) 22.68 Prob>chi2 (0.000) Notes: Cluster robust standard errors (clustering on countries) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. a overall R2. b within R2. Regression with country fixed-effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustering on countries) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
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